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Abstract 
New behavioral and neuroscientific evidence on the development of fairness behaviors in 
children demonstrates that the signatures of human fairness can be traced into childhood. 
Children make sacrifices for fairness (1) when they have less than others, (2) when others have 
been unfair and (3) when they have more than others. These latter two responses mark a critical 
departure from what is observed in other species because they enable fairness to be upheld even 
when doing so goes against self-interest. This new work can be fruitfully combined with insights 
from cognitive neuroscience to understand the mechanisms of developmental change. 
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Introduction 
Fairness is a hallmark of our species’ ability to maintain cooperative relationships with large 
numbers of unrelated—and often unfamiliar—others. However, there is much debate over the 
psychological foundations of this sense of fairness. Which aspects of fairness are engrained in 
our biology and which depend on learned social norms? What are the psychological mechanisms 
and motivations that give rise to human fairness? Why does fairness appear to drive decisions in 
some contexts but not others? To answer these questions, it is critical to understand how fairness 
emerges in child development, as studies of adults alone do not allow us to differentiate between 
psychological processes that are acquired through socialization and those that have deeper 
biological roots. Indeed, a complete understanding of any behavior requires a description of its 
developmental course and an examination of what causes behavioral change over the lifespan1-3. 
Studies of child development can provide unique insight into the psychology of fairness 
in important ways: First, developmental data can help identify the aspects of fairness that are 
foundational and those that are more malleable. Second, charting how fairness behavior changes 
across development can shed light on the specific cognitive mechanisms that enable its 
emergence and expression. Finally, combining insights from development with work examining 
how fairness is instantiated at the neural level can help us understand the psychological 
foundations on which the human sense of fairness is built.  
In this review, we appraise and integrate recent developmental and neuroscientific 
evidence on fairness. The resulting neuro-developmental perspective provides novel insights into 
the foundations of fairness in our species. First, we argue that the signatures of our uniquely 
human sense of fairness are present in childhood. We then summarize the current state of 
knowledge for neural mechanisms that support fairness and highlight recent work on the 
developmental neuroscience of fairness. Lastly, we identify key neural processes that change 
during childhood and propose how the developmental integration of these systems can explain 
the temporal emergence of the human sense of fairness. 
 
The signatures of human fairness 
Fairness is a complex concept that is applied across many social contexts. A central focus for 
both theoretical and empirical work on fairness has been principles governing the allocation of 
resources, so-called distributive justice. Specifically, multiple experimental paradigms have been 
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developed to explore how both adults and children divide up valuable resources and respond to 
unequal resource allocations (e.g. Box 1). Equality acts as an objective benchmark in 
investigations of fairness4,5 and provides a foundation for mature conceptions of fairness6. 
Understanding how people react to unequal distributions, all else equal (i.e., in the absence of 
richer contextual information like neediness and deservedness7), provides the key starting point 
for unlocking the psychology of fairness in humans. Indeed, this focus on equality as an 
objective benchmark of fairness has led to an explosion of studies across disciplines, including 
psychology, economics and anthropology8-10. In our review of children’s developing fairness 
behavior we adopt this same focus on equality and, more specifically, on children’s responses to 
unequal outcomes. Additionally, we identify the motivations and mechanisms that lead to equal 
outcomes across development.  
One striking feature of adult fairness is that people are sometimes willing to pay a cost to 
avoid inequality. This has been shown in four main contexts (Fig 1). First, people pay to achieve 
equality when they receive less than others (disadvantageous inequity aversion8,9,11). Second, 
adults not only make sacrifices to be fair themselves, they also punish those who are unfair. This 
punishment comes in two forms, as second-party punishment, where the punisher has been 
directly affected by unfair behavior12,13 and as third-party punishment, where the punisher 
witnesses unfairness happening to others but is not directly affected by it14,15. Importantly, in 
both forms of punishment, the punisher punishes unfairness in others at personal cost or at least 
to no immediate personal benefit, thus overriding self-interest to enforce fairness. Finally, people 
reject unfair distributions even when they receive more than others (advantageous inequity 
aversion8,9,11), demonstrating costly conformity to a fairness norm. 
We organize our review of children’s emerging fairness behavior around these four 
signatures of human fairness. This structure is grounded in behavioral game theory10 and 
provides a taxonomy for exploring children’s decisions about fairness in four key contexts in 
which they must reconcile their own self-interest with a desire for fairness. This taxonomy also 
represents, we argue, a developmental progression that is relevant for theories of fairness. Most 
broadly, children show an aversion to receiving less than others first – a focus on unfairness to 
self – and only later engage in decisions that correct or prevent unfairness to others. 
Theoretically, this progression marks a key shift towards understanding fairness as a norm that 
should be enforced, an important marker of a uniquely human sense of fairness. 
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------------------------------------------Fig 1 & Box 1 about here ------------------------------------------- 
 
Of the four contexts described above, only behavior broadly consistent with 
disadvantageous inequity aversion has been found in nonhuman species16-18. These data suggest 
that an aversion to getting less than others—or, at least, to getting less than you could be 
getting—has deep biological roots. However, there is no evidence that nonhuman animals 
enforce fairness through second- and third-party punishment19-21 and virtually no evidence that 
they reject advantageous allocations to prevent others from getting less than them18. Punishment 
and advantageous inequity aversion thus constitute clear signatures of the uniquely human sense 
of fairness. These reactions mark a critical departure from what is observed outside of humans 
because they enable fairness norms to be upheld even when doing so is not motivated by self-
interest. In particular, the enforcement of norms by unaffected third parties is theorized to be a 
key means of stabilizing cooperative behavior in humans22. Sanctioning norm violators in this 
context depends on the belief that ‘others ought to be fair generally’ not just that ‘others ought to 
be fair to me’. In thinking about the origins of this behavior, a critical question emerges: namely, 
when do children shift from being the ones sanctioned for fairness norm violations to the ones 
sanctioning others. The answer to this question bears on deep theoretical issues about the origins 
of cooperation in development and, in particular, the origins of the uniquely human desire to 
promote good behavior in others.  
In recent years, research has begun to examine when, during development, children begin 
to respond negatively to unequal resource distributions and, critically, when they will pay to 
avoid them (Box 2). In what follows, we summarize evidence showing that the four signatures of 
human fairness behavior are present in childhood, with disadvantageous inequity aversion 
emerging early, a willingness to punish unfairness in others (second- and third-party punishment) 
emerging next and advantageous inequity aversion appearing last. We then ground this 
description of behavioral phenomena in a framework of potential neurocognitive mechanisms 
underlying the emergence of these fairness behaviors. 
 
--------------------------------------------- Box 2 about here -------------------------------------------------- 
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Children show the signatures of human fairness 
 
Children avoid getting less than others (disadvantageous inequity aversion) 
Several recent studies have found that infants are surprised when witnessing resources 
distributed unequally for no apparent reason23-19, and by three years of age children will state 
explicitly that equality is a norm that should be followed in distribution tasks26. However, when 
young children face inequality themselves, they are measurably upset at receiving less, but quite 
happy to receive more27. By four years of age, children will pay a cost to prevent a peer from 
getting more, showing the first signs of disadvantageous inequity aversion.  In one task, the 
Inequity Game (Box 1), children could accept or reject different allocations of sweets28 (Box 2). 
Children as young as four rejected allocations that placed them at a disadvantage relative to a 
peer, sacrificing a small amount of candy to prevent their partner from receiving more. 
Nevertheless, these rejections were not automatic – children took longer to make their decisions 
when facing a disadvantage compared to when they faced equal trials. This finding suggests that 
children experience a conflict between self-interest and fairness to the self when confronted with 
disadvantageous inequity. Results from the Inequity Game and other experimental paradigms 
show that children’s aversion to disadvantageous outcomes tends to grow stronger with age28,29. 
Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that children are more tolerant of disadvantages when 
they create them themselves, a prosocial act30,31. 
Subsequent work has shown that disadvantageous inequity aversion is even observed in 
nonsocial contexts (i.e., when a child receives the lesser of two alternative payoffs), although the 
response is stronger in social situations when the larger payoff goes to a peer32. Additional work 
has shown that children’s rejections of disadvantageous allocations are motivated by spite—the 
desire to deprive a peer of the better payoff33. Most recently, this task was conducted across 
seven societies to characterize cross-cultural variation in the development of disadvantageous 
inequity aversion. Results showed that children across all societies rejected disadvantageous 
allocations, providing evidence that disadvantageous inequity aversion may be a universal 
response in humans34.  
 
Children punish those who have been unfair to them (second-party punishment) 
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While in the Inequity Game, children make decisions about pre-existing distributions, in 
bargaining tasks such as the Ultimatum Game (Box 1) these distributions are actual offers made 
by a peer. In this context, disadvantageous (selfish) offers can be viewed as an intentional slight 
and the responder has the opportunity to punish the proposer by rejecting all of the rewards. 
Research consistently shows that with age, children become more likely to reject unfair offers. 
While few studies have tested young children, existing studies show that children at the ages of 
4-5 years tend to accept everything, even highly unfair offers35-37. By contrast, starting around 6-
8 years of age, children begin to systematically reject unfair offers in which they would obtain 
less than half of the resource37-43, a response that becomes even stronger with age38,39,42,44-46 but see 
43. These studies point to important age-differences, with the first clear signs of children being 
willing to pay a cost to punish unfair treatment around 6-8 years of age. 
When in the role of the proposer in the Ultimatum Game, older, but not younger children, 
make mostly fair offers, perhaps because they realize that the responder will not accept a 
disadvantageous proposal. To assess whether this change is truly strategic or represents a shift to 
more generous behavior, researchers have compared children’s offers in Ultimatum Games with 
their offers in Dictator Games (Box 1). If children are able to anticipate that the recipient will 
punish them for unfair offers, they should offer the recipient significantly more in Ultimatum 
Games (where the recipient can punish) than Dictator Games (where the recipient has no such 
power). Studies show that in the age-range of 6 to 8 years, children offer significantly more as 
proposers in Ultimatum Games than in Dictator Games37,40,43-45. Few studies have tested younger 
children, but existing studies find that younger children do not offer significantly more in the 
Ultimatum Game than the Dictator Game36,37, suggesting that more strategic behavior emerges 
with age.  
Taken together, both children’s behavior as responders and proposers show that starting 
around 6 to 8 years of age, children engage in and expect second-party punishment: they will pay 
a cost to prevent unfair treatment towards themselves and anticipate that others will engage in 
this behavior as well. 
 
Children punish those who have been unfair to others (third-party punishment) 
Costly third-party punishment of unfairness requires that people combine a reaction to unfairness 
with a willingness to intervene against bad behavior, even when they are unaffected bystanders. 
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Developmental data from infancy suggest that the building blocks for third-party punishment can 
be found early in ontogeny: infants and toddlers dislike antisocial agents who, for example, slam 
a box shut that another agent is trying to open and like individuals who punish these antisocial 
agents47,48. By mid-childhood, children will punish individuals for violating fairness norms, 
marking the emergence of costly third-party punishment38,49-51. For instance, when children are 
presented with scenarios in which they learned of a selfish child who had refused to share 
candies with a partner, six-year-olds will sacrifice their own resources to take candies away from 
the selfish individual49. Another study testing older children and adolescents showed that 8-, 12- 
and 15-year-olds punished others for unfair resource divisions, with the degree of punishment 
mapping onto the degree of unfairness38.  
Children’s incipient willingness to engage in third-party punishment is part of an 
important shift away from a myopic focus on promoting fairness for self to a more generalized 
focus on promoting fairness for others. This shift requires an integration of a willingness to 
punish at a cost to oneself with recognition of fairness as a norm that must be followed by all.  
Importantly, this behavior places children in a more active role as enforcers of cooperative 
norms. The emergence of costly third-party punishment in children suggests that the motivation 
and skills needed to promote cooperation in others are present in mid-childhood. 
 
Children sometimes avoid getting more than others (advantageous inequity aversion) 
Although young children refuse inequity when they receive less than others, they seem perfectly 
willing— even eager— to receive more than others28,52. However, by 8 years of age children 
begin to reject advantageous allocations in the Inequity Game, incurring a relatively high cost to 
ensure that a peer does not receive less than them28,32,34. Children in this age group take longer to 
decide what to do when faced with an advantageous allocation compared to an equal allocation, 
indicating that children experience a conflict when faced with this decision28. Although the 
nature of the conflict is unclear, the large reward to oneself creates a tension between self-
interest and a desire either to enact fairness norms or, at least in public contexts like the Inequity 
Game, a desire to appear fair to the partner. Additionally, unlike rejections of disadvantageous 
inequality, which occur both in social and nonsocial contexts (i.e., when the child is not paired 
with a partner), children exclusively reject advantageous inequity when they are paired with a 
social partner, suggesting that advantageous inequity aversion is an inherently social response32.  
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 Other experimental paradigms have found a similar shift at this age in which children 
now pay a cost to reduce their advantage over others29,53.  Interestingly, one recent cross-cultural 
study suggests that this behavior may not be universal during childhood34. Experiments with the 
Inequity Game found advantageous inequity aversion in late childhood in the US, Canada and 
Uganda, but not in India, Mexico, Peru and Senegal. This study offers further evidence that 
advantageous inequity aversion is tied to local norms of fairness and expectations of child 
behavior that vary by culture. 
These findings show that an important developmental shift occurs in late childhood: 
namely, a focus on ensuring that I get treated well is matched by a desire to ensure that others 
also get treated well, resulting in a more generalized preference for fairness. Existing cross-
cultural comparisons suggest that the exact time at which this developmental shift occurs may 
vary, perhaps due to the acquisition of local norms.  
 
Synthesis of the emergence of fairness behaviors in children 
Children show the signatures of our uniquely human sense of fairness: not only do they react to 
unfairness when they get less than others, they also reject unfairness when it is advantageous and 
pay to punish others for unfair behavior. These data paint an interesting picture with regards to 
the time course of changes in fairness related behaviors, with concerns for fairness to self 
emerging first, a willingness to punish unfairness in others emerging next and, finally, a 
willingness to reject advantageous unfairness emerging last (Fig. 2). This trajectory provides a 
clear example of why developmental studies are so useful: they demonstrate that these behaviors 
are dissociated across development, despite appearing to be united in adulthood. In doing so, this 
evidence provides a theoretical motivation for considering potentially distinct neural mechanisms 
that underlie these behaviors. In the next section, we review evidence for the cognitive and 
neural mechanisms that underlie fairness behaviors in children. We suggest candidate 
neurocognitive processes that may help shift children from an early-emerging self-regarding 
form of fairness to a later-emerging willingness to both conform to and enforce fairness norms 
even at cost to the self.  
 
----------------------------------------------- Fig 2 about here ------------------------------------------------ 
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Mechanisms supporting the emergence of fairness in humans 
Although few developmental studies exist on neurocognitive mechanisms of fairness 
specifically, much is known about brain development more generally (Box 3). Further, research 
on neurocognitive mechanisms of fairness in adults can inform our understanding of what neural 
changes are required to reach a mature sense of fairness. In this section, we highlight the role of 
neurocognitive mechanisms—both common and unique—for each of our four signature fairness 
behaviors. 
 
----------------------------------------------- Box 3 about here ------------------------------------------------ 
 
Shared components of fairness 
The four signatures of human fairness vary along different psychological dimensions but also 
have certain key elements in common. Children must first engage in social comparison to note 
the difference in quantities allocated between players and then judge the difference to be unfair 
or undesirable. While this ability appears to be in place already in infancy23-25, it does not in and 
of itself explain the emergence of fair behaviors. A critical aspect of fair behavior is the 
willingness to incur a cost to create equality. Such costs create a conflict between self-interest 
and a fair outcome. Resolving this conflict and implementing the fair outcome thus also requires 
behavioral control. It is well documented that behavioral control improves considerably 
throughout childhood, becoming increasingly proactive, flexible and self-guided54,55. Behavioral 
control therefore constitutes a primary candidate to account for developmental shifts in fairness 
behaviors as the costs to create fair outcomes increase.  
Research on neurocognitive mechanisms of behavioral responses to unfairness in adults 
has identified a network of brain regions that is activated during fairness decisions. These 
regions can be tied to the cognitive processes shared across the fairness behaviors and includes 
the anterior insula, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
as well as dorsal- and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices (VLPFC and DLPFC, respectively) and 
striatal brain regions56-58 (see Fig 3). In the context of fair decisions, these brain regions subserve 
specific functions, such as social comparison (i.e. ventral striatum), sensitivity to fairness and 
emotional responses to inequality (e.g. anterior insula), conflict between following norms and 
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one’s own desires (i.e. ACC), complying with social norms (i.e. DLPFC) and implementing fair 
decisions (i.e.VMPFC). Thus, fairness behaviors are undergirded by a whole network of brain 
regions, supporting a multitude of cognitive and affective processes that interact with one 
another to bring about fair decisions57-59. This outline of the neural systems involved provides a 
starting point for identifying the role of specific mechanisms needed to implement the four 
signature fairness behaviors and how they change with age. 
 
----------------------------------------------- Fig 3 about here ------------------------------------------------ 
 
Creating fairness for myself: negative emotions of anger, envy and spite  
Developmental studies report that preschool children display negative emotional reactions when 
they receive less than a peer27. Additionally, the subjective experience of envy has been shown to 
relate to disadvantageous inequity aversion in children as young as 6 years60. Other work 
suggests that disadvantageous inequity aversion in children is motivated by spite, since children 
only reject a small reward when doing so will reduce the partner’s larger reward33. Having less 
than others thus elicits a negative emotional state, which drives the response to reject such 
divisions. This links well with findings in adults, where activity of the amygdala, a brain region 
implicated in various emotional states61, particularly negative ones62,63, correlated positively with 
subjects’ willingness to reduce others’ outcomes to create equality64. The experience of negative 
emotions is thus a key component for the emergence of disadvantageous inequity aversion and 
second-party punishment, the earliest developmental signatures of fairness. Importantly, 
however, these aspects of fairness are still quite limited, as they focus on fairness towards 
oneself. 
 
Self interest vs. fairness: conflict resolution, behavioral control and social norm compliance 
Creating fairness entails incurring a cost, which in turn creates a conflict with self-interest. 
Evidence of such a conflict can be detected in children’s reaction times. For instance, in the 
Inequity Game (see Box 2), children of all ages take longer to decide when faced with 
disadvantageous inequity than equity.  
Resolving the conflict between self-interest and fairness can by achieved by complying to 
social norms, which requires behavioral control. Such conflict is evident in all four signatures of 
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human fairness. However, the neural mechanisms of conflict resolution and, more importantly, 
behavioral control and social norm compliance have been most extensively investigated in the 
context of punishing others’ fairness violations. Several studies in adults report a consistently 
activated system of brain regions implicated in resolving conflicts during both second-party58,65-
67 and third-party punishment tasks57,68-70. In addition to the anterior insula, this network includes 
the ACC and the DLPFC. Activity of the ACC is considered to reflect conflict detection and 
resolution71 and, in the context of punishing fairness violations, is argued to reflect the conflict 
between self-interest and restoring fairness66.  
Both, fMRI studies and studies using non-invasive brain stimulation such as transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) and direct current stimulation (tDCS) suggest that activity of both 
DLPFC and VMPFC is crucial for social norm compliance66,72-76. These findings suggest that 
DLPFC is critical in implementing norm-related behavior by means of exerting a modulating 
effect on VMPFC, a brain region implicated in integrating costs and benefits of multiple decision 
options74. Such an interpretation of DLPFC is supported by studies of the neurocognitive 
underpinnings of other types of norm violations (i.e. criminal acts) in a third-party context, 
which also suggest that DLPFC is involved in norm enforcement77,78.  
The development of behavioral control has been shown to explain the emergence of 
punishing norm violations. For instance, in one study, 6-year-olds claimed that they would reject 
an unfair offer when asked hypothetically, yet when faced with real situations they accepted such 
offers readily44. This stands in contrast to older children who do as they say more often. Such a 
developmental dissociation between judgments of fairness and actual behavior has been found in 
other contexts as well. Most notably, in Dictator Games children as young as 3 years recognize 
an equal split as a norm but keep more for themselves, suggesting that young children do not 
view fairness norms as obligatory26. By about 6-8 years of age, children are more likely to follow 
the stated norm in this task, but compliance with the norm appears linked to behavioral control at 
least through 12 years of age79. Finally, a recent study provides direct evidence for the role of 
developmental changes in DLPFC and associated behavioral control in accounting for changes in 
social norm compliance. Proposer offers in the Ultimatum Game compared to the Dictator Game 
in children aged 7 to 13 years were strongly correlated with behavioral control, and in turn 
supported by both function and structure of the left DLPFC44. Behavioral control is thus likely to 
be an important mechanism that supports the emergence of norm compliance required for 
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punishment of norm violations.  
Behavioral control is also required when rejecting advantageous distributions, given that 
a relatively large sum is sacrificed for the sake of equality. Notably, once advantageous inequity 
aversion emerges around 8 years of age, children take longer to make their decisions suggesting 
a conflict between self-interest and norm compliance28. Sacrificing an advantage and resolving 
this conflict in favor of norm compliance depends on an improvement or shift in the quality of 
behavioral control. One such developmental shift is that behavioral control becomes increasingly 
more proactive, flexible and internalized54. This leads to the hypothesis that as behavioral control 
increases, fairness norms will be followed in a wider set of contexts and also applied not just to 
others but also to oneself80. An incipient line of support for this hypothesis comes from the 
development of advantageous inequity aversion in late childhood, where a cost is imposed on 
oneself as opposed to others to create equality.  
 
Creating fairness for others: the increasing value of fair outcomes 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the mechanisms that allow children to incur costs on behalf of 
another, as is the case both in third-party punishment and in rejections of advantageous 
distributions. In addition to an increased ability to comply with norms, we argue that this shift 
can be partially explained by an increasing value on fair outcomes per se. This is evidenced by 
children around 8 years of age who in some countries show clear signs of advantageous inequity 
aversion and also explicitly claim that they do so because it did not seem fair to have more than 
someone else28. The anterior insula has long been noted to be particularly sensitive to fairness 
violations65. It has also been implicated in responding to the emotional experiences of others81 
and thus constitutes a region highly suited to respond to others falling victim to fairness 
violations82,83. It is therefore noteworthy that, in adults, both in the context of third-party 
punishment as well as advantageous inequity aversion, the anterior insula plays a critical role, 
particularly with regards to its connectivity to other brain regions, such as the striatum and the 
VMPFC57,64,70. We propose that studying the developmental changes in the functional 
recruitment and integration of the anterior insula into the neural circuitry underlying fairness 
behaviors is a promising avenue to explaining the emergence and development of fairness in 
childhood.  
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Synthesis of the mechanisms supporting the emergence of fairness behaviors in children 
In sum, a set of circumscribed mechanisms supports the emergence of distinct signatures of 
human fairness (Fig 4). When taken together with behavioral evidence, neural data begin to paint 
a more complete picture of the emergence of fairness in childhood and provide critical insight 
into the mechanisms that support its emergence. Strikingly, the dissociation between 
disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion observed across development is mirrored 
by unique supporting mechanisms. To synthesize what we know so far: First, the appearance of 
disadvantageous inequity aversion is driven by envious motives of not wanting to have less than 
others. Second, punishment of unfairness in others appears to occur as a function of increased 
behavioral control, which supports norm compliance. Finally, since incurring costs to forgo an 
unfair advantage and punishing on behalf of others seem to rely on a heightened sense of 
fairness, we propose that both behaviors are likely to be coded, at least in part, in the insula. 
Based on adult data, connectivity between the insula, striatum and VMPFC appears to be a 
critical neural mechanism for both advantageous inequity aversion and third-party punishment. 
Connectivity between distinct neural systems (Box 3) is a protracted developmental process. 
This may help explain why advantageous inequity aversion, which we hypothesize to be reliant 
on this mechanism, emerges later in development. However, before putting too much weight on 
this claim, it is important to test this hypothesis with developmental samples.  
 
----------------------------------------------- Fig 4 about here ------------------------------------------------ 
 
Conclusions and Future directions 
The evidence reviewed here offers an exciting look at the emergence of fairness behavior in 
human ontogeny and the mechanisms supporting it. However, our working definition of fairness 
is admittedly a lean one: namely, costly responses to unequal resource distributions. Of course, 
fairness judgments and behaviors are not restricted to these cases and an important direction for 
future work is to understand how children make decisions about other forms of fairness such as 
procedural84 and retributive justice85. Additionally, we know that a suite of factors influences 
fairness behavior in adults and children, including reputational concerns86, perspective taking87, 
in-group favoritism51, as well as cues of deservedness such as merit88 and need7. Integrating 
evidence about the extent to which these factors affect fairness behavior with burgeoning 
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neuroscientific data on these same aspects of human cognition (e.g. reputation89, perspective 
taking90 and parochialism91) is an exciting avenue for future work. Moreover, we know little 
about the extent to which inter-individual variation in different aspects of children’s developing 
cognition (e.g. perspective-taking, numerical knowledge, working memory) influences children’s 
fairness behavior. Characterizing influences on fairness at the individual level will provide 
detailed insight into the cognitive mechanisms that support its development. 
The human sense of fairness has its roots in ontogeny, yet shows striking developmental 
changes with age. In early childhood, children avoid having less than others (disadvantageous 
inequity aversion), by mid-childhood they punish unfairness in both second- and third-party 
contexts and by late-childhood they avoid having more than others (advantageous inequity 
aversion). Recent neuroscientific evidence offers possible explanations for these changes. 
Specifically, improvements in behavioral control and a growing value placed on fair outcomes 
may help explain how children shift from a seemingly myopic focus on ensuring fairness for self 
towards a more generalized sense of fairness which entails the costly enforcement of and 
compliance to fairness norms. More broadly we argue that the integration of evidence from 
developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience can offer fundamental insights into the 
mechanisms supporting the human sense of fairness. 
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Figure legends 
 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of four classes of fairness behavior in children.  
 
Figure 2. The emergence of fairness behaviors in childhood. 
 
Figure 3. Brain regions supporting fairness behavior in children and adults. 
 
Figure 4. Diagram showing the developmental changes in the emergence of fairness behaviors in 
childhood along with the neurocognitive mechanisms hypothesized to explain the observed shifts 
from fairness for oneself to fairness for others. Negative emotions such as anger, envy and spite 
drive reactions towards unfairness to self, presumably mediated by the amygdala (purple) and the 
anterior insula (green). Incurring costs to follow and enforce social norms and achieve fair 
outcomes is related to the development of behavioral control, mediated by the development of 
connectivity between DLPFC (blue) and VMPFC (orange). Finally, we hypothesize that an 
increased value placed on fairness drives reactions towards unfairness to others, which is linked 
to increased connectivity of the anterior insula (green) with the striatum (red) and, more 
importantly, VMPFC (orange).   
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Boxes 
 
Box 1. Description of economics games 
 
Dictator Game 
Player One is given an endowment of a resource and can give some or all of their endowment to 
Player Two. Player Two is a passive recipient. 
 
Inequity Game 
An allocation is distributed between Players One and Two by a third party (e.g. an 
experimenter). Player One responds to the allocation while Player Two is a passive recipient. If 
Player One accepts the allocation, both players receive their allocated payoffs. If Player One 
rejects the allocation, neither player receives a payoff.  
 
Third-Party Punishment Game 
A variation of the Dictator Game (see above) in which a third player (Player Three) observes 
Player One’s donation to Player Two. Player Three can then intervene to reduce Player One’s 
earnings, which constitutes third-party punishment. 
 
Ultimatum Game 
Player One is given an endowment of a resource and can offer any portion of their endowment to 
Player Two. Player Two can either accept or reject Player One’s offer. If Player Two accepts, 
they both receive their allocated portions, as proposed by Player One. If Player Two rejects, 
neither player receives a payoff. Rejections in this context would constitute second-party 
punishment).   
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Box 2. Testing fairness behavior in children 
Research on children’s understanding of fairness has a long history in developmental 
psychology. Early methods focused on interviews and hypothetical scenarios, which have the 
advantage of removing immediate self-interest and allowing children to express their judgments 
about fair allocations. However, these methods do not assess children’s fairness behavior when 
actual resources are at stake. A recent integration of methods from behavioral economics into 
developmental research has allowed for tests of children’s fairness behavior when achieving fair 
outcomes is costly. Often the decisions children face are simplified to reduce the need for 
considering multiple alternative distributions and to contrast specific choices in order to reveal 
children’s motivations and priorities. There are two main classes of paradigm that have been 
used to study fairness behavior in children: paradigms in which children can select equality over 
other options and tasks that measure children’s responses to unequal allocations.  
 
Choosing equality over other options 
One common choice paradigm for children involves selecting one of two possible distributions 
of resources between the child and a peer29,92. For example, children can choose either one candy 
each (1-1) or two for the self and zero for the peer (2-0). Children receive other choice sets as 
well, typically a Prosocial choice (1-1 v 1-0) and an Envy choice (1-1 v 1-2). Analyzing 
decisions across trials reveals an increasing tendency to choose the equal option with age, which 
has been interpreted as evidence for the emergence of an egalitarian motive. Variations on these 
paradigms have also allowed researchers to identify a period in development during which 
children actively seek an advantage over peers, even when doing so is costly, as opposed to 
simply avoiding a disadvantage52. Children were presented with two distribution options, one of 
which was equal (2-2) and one of which provided them with an advantage (1-0). Researchers 
found that 5-6 year olds were willing to accept a lower payoff overall to achieve a relative 
advantage over their peer. 
 
Measuring responses to unfairness 
The choice of an equal outcome in the forced choice tasks above could be supported by several 
mechanisms: altruistic motives (everyone should get at least one), egalitarian motives (everyone 
should get the same) or advantageous inequity aversion (I should not get more). In order to 
examine the specific mechanisms that underlie the choice of equality, a different paradigm is 
needed. The Inequity Game achieves this by making the equal outcome a) costly and b) not 
altruistic. Here, children face a forced choice decision that is either equal (0-0) or unequal. Each 
pair of children tested receives only one form of inequality: disadvantageous inequity (DI), 1-4; 
or advantageous inequity (AI), 4-1. Children can choose the equal option by rejecting the 
unequal allocation, so that both children receive nothing, or accept the inequality. Presenting the 
choices in this way isolates the mechanism at work. Rejecting either DI or AI denies rewards to 
the peer and is thus not altruistic. Rejections also deny rewards to the self and minimize the total 
rewards. By comparing children’s rejections of DI or AI to rejections of equal allocations (1-1), 
researchers have identified unique mechanisms that motivate children to choose equal outcomes: 
disadvantageous inequity aversion (I should not get less than you) and advantageous inequity 
aversion (I should not get more than you). 
While the Inequity Game isolates children’s responses to unequal resource distributions, 
it does not test how children react to intentional unfairness. To test these reactions, the 
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Ultimatum Game and Third-Party Punishment Game (Box 1) have been adapted for children. For 
instance, in one commonly used version of the Ultimatum Game, children are told that they will 
be paired with a partner who will either accept or reject their offer of resources. They are then 
presented with all possible resource divisions and asked to select what they would like to do. 
Using the same method, children can act as responders and either accept or reject offers made by 
a partner. This method has been successfully implemented in the scanner with children and 
adolescents, allowing researchers to measure brain activity associated with different fairness 
behaviors.  
 
----------------------------------------------- Fig 4 about here ------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Figure B1. Three examples of paradigms used to test fairness behavior in children: (A) shows a 
choice task in which the child has a choice between the equal option, 2 for self and 2 for partner, 
or the advantageous—but lower overall—option, 1 for self and 0 for partner; (B) shows the 
Inequity Game used to test children’s responses to disadvantageous (upper) and advantageous 
(lower) unfairness. In this task the actor has access to two handles and decides whether to accept 
(green handle) or reject (red the handle) different allocations; (C) shows the Ultimatum Game as 
presented to children in the scanner. 
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Box 3. Development of functional networks in childhood 
Studies of brain development have undergone a shift from charting the maturational processes of 
single regions93-95 to characterizing structural and functional neural networks96-98. The prominent 
use of resting-state functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fcMRI) could show 
that connectivity patterns in well-characterized networks such as the default-mode network (i.e. 
medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, temporo-parietal junction), the salience network (i.e. 
anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula) and a central executive network (i.e. dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and lateral parietal cortices) shift and change drastically throughout 
childhood97. These changes include a decrease in short-range and increase in long-range 
connectivity99, a shift in functional organization from local to global networks100,101 and 
increased integration between prominent functional networks from childhood through 
adulthood102. The functional consequences of these changes have been linked to robust 
developmental changes in higher cognitive functions such as behavioral control103,104. 
Network properties constitute a fundamental organizing principle of cognitive brain 
function, which is subject to considerable changes throughout development and in turn accounts 
for observed changes in cognitive functions. We apply this logic to understanding developmental 
changes in fairness. Reaching fair decisions is a vastly complex cognitive feat, requiring multiple 
operations. We argue that this process is subserved by the integration of signals from distal brain 
regions into a neural signal that guides the decision-making process. This has been shown 
repeatedly in the context of fair decisions57,64,66,70 (also see Buckholtz & Marois77 for a similar 
approach to mechanisms of norm enforcement). We argue that the development of neural 
pathways connecting distal brain regions with each other constitutes the key mechanism 
supporting developmental transitions in fair decision-making.    
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